Transfer authorized
Every challenger watching this chain independently re-evaluated the policy against the same inputs and none could produce a proof that the result differs. This is final: the window cannot be reopened.
No ABI available for selector buy(address,uint256,uint32) — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.
One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.
No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.
| Slot | Policy | WASM output | expireAfter |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0xab434a206165b8b1db8d53734a3350c1523942a8 · 0xab434a20…42a8 | 0x7b2269735f666c6167676564223a66616c73652c22726563697069656e74223a22227d | 300sets response expiry |
| 1 | 0x70887a6015c9d058531e93ee742c1a6f5b4fcef5 · 0x70887a60…cef5 | 0x — pure Rego, canonically empty | 300sets response expiry |
newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x9445404e83ef6349cd11fa7645b2dcb7629a940f --client 0xc849883664D8ce259035918048FD489a47cE592E
The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block 26,199,247. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.
Receipt hash