LIVE
TASKS 24H08 policiesCOMPLIANT0.0%0 attestedOPERATORS22 signingRESTAKED2k NEWT—MEDIAN RESPONSE——RE-VERIFIED 24H—0 invalidatedBLOCK26,236,232Ethereum
NEWTON PROTOCOL · AUTHORIZATION RECEIPT

Transfer blocked

TASK 0x8ea9d1a48d81b6c4b960d6395cd38ce7c745f8cf1ec873c44f83540c376d231f
NON-COMPLIANT
PROOF NOT ISSUED · SETTLED
This task’s policy set has been superseded. It is bound to revision 1 of 0x77ad58b3…51ae5316, and the client has written a newer one since — so the attestation is revoked regardless of its expiration block. Everything below still replays: the task froze this exact ordered set, and replay recomputes the policyId over that snapshot rather than re-reading the client. See the set as this task froze it →
SENDER
0x00000000…00000099
POLICY CLIENT
POLICIES
1 · 0 with WASM · 0x1bb3…28fb
CHAIN
Ethereum · 1
EVALUATION
NON-COMPLIANT
QUORUM
100.0% of stake · threshold 40%
CREATED
2026-10-07 19:03:23 UTC
PROOF STATE
Not issued
ATTESTATION EXPIRES
Block 26,142,537
CHALLENGE WINDOW
Closes block 26,142,507 · 30 blocks
SETTLEDThe challenge window closed at block 26,142,507 with no successful challenge.

Every challenger watching this chain independently re-evaluated the policy against the same inputs and none could produce a proof that the result differs. This is final: the window cannot be reopened.

01 — CHAIN OF CUSTODY
19:03:23Z UTCSubmittedOff-chain ingestion timestamp, carried on chain in the taskTask0x8ea9d1a48d81b6c4b960d6395cd38ce7c745f8cf1ec873c44f83540c376d231fBlock26142475
19:03:23Z UTCAggregatedQuorum signature aggregated and the response submitted
02 — INTENT

No ABI available for selector buy(address,uint256,uint32) — switch to RAW to inspect the calldata.

03 — ATTESTATION · BLS AGGREGATE (alt_bn128)
taskId0x8ea9d1a48d81b6c4b960d6395cd38ce7c745f8cf1ec873c44f83540c376d231f
policyId0xb3e7b69f0d424baf347193b8b4544e01b6c20db66e3799fdc78229b21b037232
allowedfalse — NON-COMPLIANT, covering all 1 policy
consensusDigest—
fullDigest—
aggregateSignature0x20d5e706… (G1) · 0x1f7f414a… (G2) — alt_bn128 pairing verified onchain
nonSignerPubkeys0 of 2 —
expirationBlock26,142,537
referenceBlockNumber26,142,477
04 — OPERATOR SET · WHO SIGNED
2 of 2 operators · 100.0% of stake · threshold 40%
OperatorBLS pubkey (G1)Stake weightIn aggregate
0x2411268880e711717bead20194751dc68585f9f3c8806a61ea775e16db9f98dd13c97e310cb6844fb53e5aa5cebc2e7f555e6664a1d9a232e8baf787caff005050.0%SIGNED
0x171c2fac99095add6ab830ed181be274be2875052361036f26aa38184db659a8304f9291d14855bf2c0dcb30678ce6d987026511b2b8feebd92efe1a02cac7ad50.0%SIGNED

One aggregate BLS signature is submitted on chain, not one per operator — so an individual signature, the prepare/commit phase it was produced in, and per-operator latency are not recoverable from any record. Membership above is exact; the parts the gateway discarded after aggregating are not shown rather than guessed.

05 — TEE · NOT APPLICABLE

No policy in this set reads private data, so its operators produced no enclave attestation and none is stored on chain. Privacy is decided per policy — a set needs only one slot touching a privacy namespace, and then the whole set runs inside one enclave request. Correctness here rests on the policy re-evaluation proof any challenger can generate — section 07 — not on hardware isolation.

06 — POLICIES · FROZEN AT CREATION
SlotPolicyWASM outputexpireAfter
00x1bb3b7c84cf1e2168a1041687019043fecea28fb · 0x1bb3b7c8…28fb0x — pure Rego, canonically empty60sets response expiry
Which policy denied is not recorded. TaskResponse carries a single bool allowed for the whole set — every policy above was evaluated, and one denial was enough — and no per-policy result. Re-running newt_simulatePolicy against this client returns a per-policy breakdown, but that is a simulation of the set as configured now, not a record of this task.
07 — VERIFY INDEPENDENTLY
newton-cli policy-client status --registry 0x9445404e83ef6349cd11fa7645b2dcb7629a940f --client 0x77ad58b33BF669829B809B1d4704447551Ae5316

The aggregate signature verifies against the operator set registered at block 26,142,477. Anyone may re-run this check — and challenge submission is permissionless, so anyone who finds a mismatch can act on it directly.

SEAL
Issued 2026-10-07 19:03:23Z UTC
Receipt hash